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I’d like to thank Nigel for kindly letting me comment on his blog post in 
this fashion.  Whilst we disagree about many aspects of Brexit, our 
discussions (in contrast to so much of the frenzied public discourse) 
have never been any less than civil and have always been 
interesting.  There are also important areas where we agree.  We 
share an optimism that in the medium term, technology has the 
potential to greatly reduce trade barriers around the world, including 
the UK – whether it is inside various EU structures or not. 
I also agree that there is a risk of “over-hyping” elements of Brexit, 
particularly in the event of a “no-deal” scenario.  There are some 
actions that the UK is able to take unilaterally in order to mitigate the 
pain of ‘no deal’ and the starting position of equivalence is helpful in 
certain respects.  This is particularly true for inward-bound 
goods.  Moreover, there are actions that can (and probably would) be 
taken on the part of the EU as a whole and certain EU27 states 
(notably France and the Netherlands) to facilitate trade.  It will be 
difficult and it will be painful, but it is likely to fall short of the 
Armageddon predicted by some. 
Nevertheless, just because I’d rather lose 3 fingers than my arm this 
does not make it sensible to take a hacksaw to my digits!  It is true 
that only 6-8% of businesses export to the EU, but these tend to be 
larger and more-productive firms in sectors that engage in 
international trade.  What about the myriad of businesses that are 
suppliers to those firms (or even those in tier-3 and below)?  In fact, 
many businesses may be unaware that an export-intensive business 
(possibly even in another sector) accounts for a non-trivial part of their 
total turnover.  The reality is that this 6-8% can be multiplied, 
particularly if one looks at employment (on average, larger firms trade 
more intensively).  Chen et al. (2018), for example, find that some 
12.2% of the UK’s GDP faces trade-related exposure to Brexit with 
the figures in many regions much higher than that. 
Focussing on the fact that the UK runs trade deficit with the EU27 and 
a surplus with the rest of the world is an economic fallacy. This is why: 
• A UK car manufacturer buys parts worth £20,000 from Germany 
and uses them to build a car. 
• The car is then exported from the UK to the USA and sold for 
£25,000. 
• The workers from the factory then buy £5,000 of wine from 
France. 
In this example, the UK has a trade deficit of £20,000 with Germany 
and £5,000 with France and a surplus of £25,000 with the USA.  Does 
this mean we should prioritise trade with the USA?  No!  The trade 
with the USA quite clearly depends on the parts from Germany and if 
these become more difficult to import or more expensive to obtain 
then the British manufacturer will lose out (either having to pay lower 
wages or reduce profits – perhaps to the point of shutting down). 
What about trade with France?  Well, the UK is clearly not dependent 
on French parts to sell vehicles into the USA.  Should we therefore 
only permit British wine drinkers to drink American wine (after all, we 
have a surplus with them!)  Clearly not: the trade deficit would remain 
the same but UK consumers benefit from being able to drink French 
wine.  There are gains from trade specialisation (interestingly recent 
research suggests that modelling trade to include intermediate goods 
gives even greater gains (Soo, 2018)) and the benefits to UK 
consumers are substantial.  It is both normal and healthy to run a 
trade deficit with some partners and a surplus with others, just as I run 
a surplus with my employer and a deficit with my local supermarket. 
What about the fact that the UK’s deficit with the EU is larger than its 
surplus with the rest of the world?  Ultimately, this is not an EU 
specific issue but a very British one: we run a trade deficit (and, 
indeed, a current account deficit) with the world as a whole.  It makes 
no sense to split this into specific trading partners, but rather needs to 
be seen as a coherent whole.  An increase in gross exports to 
countries outside the EU may only have been possible due to an 
increase in imported components from the EU: far from being 
disgraceful, that CAGR of 20% may in part have facilitated the rapid 
growth of non-EU exports that has been so lauded by 
Brexiters.  Equally, if British IT staff have been particularly successful 
at exporting computer games to the US, and use the proceeds to buy 
a Porsche, should we force them to buy Cadillacs instead (so as to 
even out our bilateral trade deficits?)  Similarly, the “suspiciously low” 
Euro-Sterling exchange rate is set not by some nefarious 
Commissioner in Brussels but rather by market forces.  True, central 
bank policy has an impact on this but that has nothing to do with the 
EU.  If the UK Government were so minded, it could order the Bank of 
England to peg Sterling to the Euro: membership of the EU is simply 
irrelevant in this respect. 
This then leads us to the fundamentals of what leaving the EU entails 
for trade: increasing trade barriers with the EU.  I agree that in the 
event the UK remains completely aligned with EU standards 
(particularly sanitary and phytosanitary standards) then frictions would 
not be as great as if they were changed wholesale.  Nevertheless, the 
EU might still wish to certify that products do meet the relevant 
standards.  Such certification should be relatively seamless but in 
order for this to be true, the UK would have to completely adhere to 
EU regulations (and a mutual-recognition agreement signed with the 
EU would be deeply beneficial in this regard). 
It is difficult to see how this would sit with “taking back control” as the 
UK would essentially be agreeing to adhere to EU legislation but 
giving up its vote.  Moreover, whilst the Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement rules against unjustified or arbitrary additional barriers, it 
allows enormous scope to countries seeking to impose “justifiable” 
standards (e.g. safety standards, animal welfare standards etc.) and 
the UK would need to maintain complete alignment with these as they 
changed (again with no say).  This might not be as straightforward as 
some believe: the EU would need to be satisfied with UK 
implementation of any new directives.  As with phytosanitary 
standards, certification might be an issue.  Spot-checks would also 
need to occur to ensure that the correct customs duties have been 
paid (the case of smuggled garlic nicely illustrates just how difficult 
policing often is (Paladini, Forthcoming)).  As the case of the 
Norwegian-Swedish border illustrates, these alone can cause delays 
at peak times. 
Similarly, WTO status implies the UK leaving a host of other things (at 
least unless and until arrangements to the contrary are 
negotiated).  There is no guarantee that UK-issued Community 
Licenses would remain valid (in which case UK hauliers would need to 
default to either ECMT permits, which are dramatically limited in 
number or old bilateral agreements negotiated with EU member 
states).  In and of itself this could add significant trade frictions at 
those borders where speedy movement is key (most notably the 
Chunnel).  The EU might choose to recognise these permits but it is 
not automatic and for it to do so would be an essentially benevolent 
act (albeit perhaps in part a self-interested one given a mutual desire 
to avoid trade frictions). 
Leaving to WTO status would also end the UK’s membership of all EU 
regulatory agencies. Losing membership of the European Aviation 
Safety Agency and the European Chemicals Agency would be 
particularly critical, as has been pointed out in evidence to Parliament 
(Business Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 2018).  Once 
again, it might be possible to come to an arrangement that would 
minimise disruption but this would be the EU’s gift to give and not 
something the UK could do automatically.  Leaving the European 
Medical Agency could also present issues. 
Likewise, leaving to WTO status would mean being outside of the 
Single Market for services, creating problems for the significant 
number of broadcasters who broadcast from the UK into continental 
Europe (thanks to the Audio-Visual Media Services Directive).  The 
loss of passporting for the financial services industry has been widely 
covered, but some also raise some issues for insurers and certain 
legal professionals.  No doubt insurance policies can be transferred 
but the key question is whether this can be done in time in the 
absence of a Withdrawal Agreement. 
The WTO has nothing to say about any of the above issues, all of 
which create potential additional barriers to trade.  A WTO-Brexit 
wouldn’t stop trade, nor would we all drop down dead.  However, 
there is a very real chance of substantial short-term disruption and 
there are very real long-term costs to making trade more difficult even 
if these are more insidious than many acknowledge.  Ultimately, 
therefore, leaving the EU will entail an economic cost but it is first and 
foremost a political decision taken by the UK populace. 
Appendix 
In macroeconomic terms, the following mathematical expression is 
true by definition (and can be derived from the income and 
expenditure definitions of GDP): 
In other words, the trade deficit grows when domestic net saving is 
negative. 
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